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State Religious Freedom Law
ADRIENNE FULCO
On June 29, 1993, Connecticut became the first state to pass a new law 
protective of religious freedom, entitled An Act Concerning Religious Freedom, in 
response to the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Employment Division v. Smith
in 1990. This paper, which traces the legislative history of the law, has three 
objectives. The first is to identify and analyze the legal and policy concerns that 
prompted Connecticut legislators to first introduce a religious freedom restoration 
bill in 1991 and then pass a very similar version of the 1991 bill in 1993. Second, 
it will scrutinize public hearing and written testimony as well as House and Senate 
floor debate in order to understand the legal, moral, and policy questions that 
were foremost in the minds of Connecticut legislators and the witnesses who 
provided testimony at the time. Finally, it will consider the reasons why a debate 
about religious freedom that today is politically polarizing not only provoked little 
controversy at the time but also took place largely outside of public view.
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Religious Freedom Restoration Act
ADRIENNE FULCO *
INTRODUCTION
On June 29, 1993, Connecticut became the first state to pass a law 
protecting religious freedom,1 entitled An Act Concerning Religious 
Freedom, in response to the Supreme Court’s decision in Employment 
Division v. Smith in 1990.2 Although efforts to pass a similar statute were 
already underway in Congress, the law was not signed by President Bill 
Clinton until November 16, 1993.3 Somewhat surprisingly, despite the fact 
that Connecticut was the first state to pass a religious freedom restoration 
law, a search of several databases reveals that there was no journalistic 
coverage of the bill before it was passed by the Connecticut General 
Assembly or when it was signed into law by Governor Lowell P. 
Weicker, Jr.4
Moreover, a similar search of academic and law review databases 
confirms that a full treatment of the bill’s legislative history has not yet 
been written. Given the salience of the religious freedom debate today, it is 
appropriate to analyze the legislative history that focuses on the rationale 
of Connecticut legislators who passed this groundbreaking law, as well the 
actual legal and political arguments that were made in legislative hearings 
and debates. More specifically, what were the principal concerns that 
                                                                                                                         
* Adrienne Fulco is an Associate Professor of Legal and Policy Studies and the Director of the 
Public Policy and Law Program at Trinity College in Hartford, CT.
I would like to thank my colleagues at Trinity, research librarians Jeffrey Liszka and Erin 
Valentino, who provided invaluable assistance to me in the preparation of this paper. I would also like 
to thank Wilfred Esquilin and Steve Mirsky at the Connecticut State Library whose courteous and 
prompt responses to my requests for documents facilitated my work. Finally, Kate Dwyer, my former 
student (Trinity College, B.A. 2007) and a 2010 University of Connecticut J.D., who provided incisive 
advice and encouragement at the very early stages of this project. All errors that may appear are solely 
my own.
1 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-571b (2018).
2 Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
3 Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (1993) 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb et seq.).
4 A search of both the Hartford Courant and Lexis-Nexis databases uncovered no articles on the 
legislative process or the passage of the law in Connecticut.
5 Rhode Island was the only other state to pass a religious freedom law in 1993. 42 R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 42-80.1-1 (2017).
930 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:4
motivated members of the General Assembly to enact a religious freedom 
bill when only one other state undertook similar efforts as early as 1993?5
Why did Connecticut legislators, who began considering a religious 
freedom restoration act as early as 1991, believe that the state needed to act 
independently of Congress in order to protect religious freedom in the 
wake of the Smith decision? And, what were the essential provisions of the 
law that ultimately passed? Once these questions have been addressed, it is 
possible to evaluate the significance of the law and draw conclusions about 
why neither the legislative debate nor the bill’s signing by the governor 
generated public scrutiny.
This paper has three objectives. First, it is necessary to identify and 
analyze the legal and policy concerns that prompted Connecticut 
legislators to first introduce a religious freedom restoration bill in 1991 
(H.B. 6699) and then pass a very similar version of the 1991 bill in 1993.6
Second, it is necessary to scrutinize public hearing testimony and House 
and Senate floor debates7 in order to understand the legal, moral, and 
policy questions that were foremost in the minds of Connecticut legislators 
and the witnesses who provided testimony at the time. Finally, it is 
necessary to consider the reasons why a debate about religious freedom—
that today is politically polarizing—not only provoked little controversy at 
the time but also took place largely outside of public view. 
This author interviewed Connecticut Attorney General George Jepsen
to achieve a richer understanding of the context in which the state’s 
legislature heard testimony and debated the complex legal and policy 
questions surrounding the bill from its inception in 1991 to its passage in 
1993.8 Attorney General Jepsen was Senate chair of the Joint Committee 
on the Judiciary in 1993, when the bill was passed and signed into law.9 In 
addition, the author interviewed Professor Perry Dane, a distinguished 
expert on questions at the intersection of religious freedom and the law 
                                                                                                                         
6 It should be noted that the Connecticut legislature considered religious freedom bills three times: 
in 1991, 1992, and 1993. H.B. 6699, 1991 Conn. Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Conn. 1991); H.B. 5019, 
1992 Conn. Gen. Assemb., Feb. Sess. (Conn. 1992); Pub. Act No. 93-252, 1993 Conn. Gen. Assemb., 
Reg. Sess. (Conn. 1993). The 1992 bill will not be analyzed in this paper because only one hearing was 
held and there was no other committee action on the bill. 
7 One public hearing was held on March 1, 1993. An Act Concerning Religious Freedom: 
Hearing on H.B. 5645 Before the Joint Comm. on Judiciary, 1993 Conn. Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. 
(Conn. 1993).  The Connecticut House debated the bill on May 13, 1993. CONN. HOUSE SESSION 
TRANSCRIPT (May 13, 1993). The Connecticut Senate did so on May 27, 1993. CONN. SENATE 
SESSION TRANSCRIPT (May 27, 1993). The House accepted the Senate amended version of the bill on 
June 1, 1993. Pub. Act No. 93-252, 1993 Conn. Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Conn. 1993).
8 Telephone Interview with George Jepsen, Connecticut Attorney General (Feb. 5, 2018)
[hereinafter Jepsen Interview].
9 See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-571b (2018); see also CONN. SENATE SESSION TRANSCRIPT (May 
27, 1993) (indicating that then-Senator Jepsen, the chairman of the Judiciary Committee, introduced the 
Connecticut bill in the Senate).
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who testified at length before the committee in 1991.10 Information gleaned 
from these interviews provides insights into the context in which the
discussions and debates took place and is especially valuable given the 
lack of journalistic coverage of the proceedings.
Overall, a review of the public records confirms that Connecticut 
lawmakers were deeply concerned about the potential for the Smith
decision to weaken religious freedom protections, and they were 
determined to respond with strong legislation to counter its potential 
effects. Furthermore, the topics discussed touched upon legal and policy 
matters that would be debated in the United States Congress when a federal 
law was crafted later in 1993. The probing questions posed by lawmakers 
at the public hearings and committee debates sought to clarify matters of 
both constitutional and statutory law. They also worked toward a 
legislative solution that achieved the proper balance between protection for 
the freedom of religious believers to follow the commands of their faith 
and the need for government to enforce laws that at times restrict particular 
practices. 
What emerges from a review of the materials is the remarkable 
consensus among the legislators and the various witnesses who testified on 
behalf of religious denominations, advocacy groups, or as experts in the 
field of law and religion. When I spoke with him, Attorney General Jepsen 
confirmed that while there was considerable debate in 1991 and 1993 
about how best to craft a strong bill in response to the Smith decision, with 
only a few exceptions, the majority of the lawmakers and witnesses agreed
that the law was necessary to protect the rights of religious believers and 
nonbelievers alike.11 In addition, he emphasized that legislators understood 
Smith to be “a paradigm shift” of the kind that required a swift, clear 
reaction by legislators.12
I. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: H.B. 6699, AN ACT CONCERNING THE 
RESTORATION OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (1991)
The first religious freedom law was referred to the Connecticut 
legislature’s Joint Committee on the Judiciary on January 29, 1991.13
Initially, the bill moved quickly through the legislative process: the 
committee drafted a bill on March 14, 1991 and held a public hearing on 
March 22, 1991.14 The bill continued to make its way through the normal 
                                                                                                                         
10 Telephone Interview with Perry Dane, Professor of Law, Rutgers Law School (Feb. 8, 2018). 
Dane also testified in 1992.
11 Jepsen Interview, supra note 8.
12 Id.
13 An Act Concerning the Restoration of Religious Freedom, H.B. 6699, 1991 Conn. Gen. 
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Conn. 1991).
14 Id.
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legislative process, receiving favorable reports from both the Joint 
Committee on the Judiciary on April 23, 1991 and the Legislative 
Commissioner’s Office on May 7, 1991.15
Ultimately, however, the Connecticut House of Representatives
recommitted the bill to the Judiciary Committee at the end of the session, 
on May 29, 1991.16 When asked why the bill did not pass during the 1991 
session, Attorney General Jepsen explained that in 1991 the General 
Assembly was focused primarily on important budgetary matters.
Consequently, towards the end of the session, legislators did not have time 
to address other issues that were deemed to be less pressing.17 Time 
constraints are particularly relevant given the fact that the Connecticut 
legislature meets in session only once per year, beginning either in January 
or February and completing its work in June.18 In addition, the records of 
the 1993 legislative debate in the House indicate that one member of the 
legislature believed that Congress was likely to pass a federal religious 
freedom restoration act and argued that the nation “should speak with one 
voice” on the matter rather than pass religious freedom bills on a state-by-
state basis.19
As noted above, the bill was drafted by the Committee on the Judiciary 
on March 14, 1991 and referred to the committee on the next day. The 
stated purpose of the bill was to “reinstate the compelling interest test for 
free exercise of religion claims which was eliminated in the United States 
Supreme Court decision of Employment Division v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595 
(1990).”20 The bill contains four sections, each detailing a specific 
response to an aspect of the Smith decision that was understood to diminish 
religious free exercise. The first section, Section (a), provides a broad, 
robust statement of that protection:
The state and any political subdivision of the state shall not 
burden a person’s right to the free exercise of religion as 
guaranteed by the first amendment to the United States 
Constitution and section 3 of article first of the constitution 
of the state even if the burden results from a rule of general
                                                                                                                         
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 Jepsen Interview, supra note 8.
18 See Connecticut General Assembly, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/ 
Connecticut_General_Assembly [https://perma.cc/9J9T-PGHM] (“During even-numbered years, the 
General Assembly is in session from February to May. In odd-numbered years, when the state budget is 
completed, session lasts from January to June.”).
19 CONN. GEN. ASSEMB., HOUSE PROCEEDINGS 1993, vol. 36, part 25, at 4928.
20 H.B. 6699.
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applicability, except as provided in subsection (b) of this 
section.21
Section (b) then directly addresses the standard the state must meet 
when restricting religious freedom:
The state and any political subdivision of the state may 
burden a person’s free exercise of religion only if it
demonstrates that application of the burden to the person is 
essential to further a compelling governmental interest and is 
the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling 
governmental interest.22
This language clearly is aimed at restoring the test that guaranteed 
religious freedom enunciated in Sherbert v. Verner,23 which governed free 
exercise jurisprudence until the Smith decision in 1990. Under that test, if a
government action placed a substantial burden on an individual’s religious 
beliefs, then the government must have acted in the furtherance of a 
compelling state interest and used the least restrictive means to achieve its 
objectives.24
The third section of the bill, Section (c), goes on to explain:
A person whose right to the free exercise of religion has been 
burdened in violation of the provisions of this section may 
assert a claim or defense and obtain appropriate relief, 
including relief against the state or any political subdivision 
of the state, in the superior court.25
Finally, the bill defines the meaning of “person” in the following way:
“‘[P]erson’ means a natural person, partnership, corporation, association or 
society, and ‘demonstrates’ means meets the burdens of going forward 
with the evidence and of persuasion.”26
In sum, H.B. 6699 was an explicit, direct effort to restore religious 
freedom protections by means of reinstating a test that the Supreme Court 
had applied for nearly three decades. When interviewed, Attorney General 
Jepsen explained he assumed a leadership role in crafting the 1991 bill in 
order to counteract the potential impact of the Smith decision and ensure 
that the religious free exercise rights of Connecticut citizens, especially 
                                                                                                                         
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
24 Id. at 406.
25 H.B. 6699.
26 The fact that the legislators included corporations in its 1991 bill is especially interesting in 
light of current controversies that arose following the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in 2014. See 
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). This point will be addressed later in this 
article.
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those who were nonbelievers or belonged to minority religious sects, 
would be fully protected under state law.27
As mentioned above, the hearing for H.B. 6699 took place on March 
22, 1991.28 In the transcript, Representative Richard Tulisano,29 co-chair of 
the Joint Committee on the Judiciary, indicated that there would be three 
witnesses at the hearing to testify about the religious freedom bill.30
Unfortunately, official speaker registration lists could not be found in the 
document records at the State Library to confirm the credentials and 
affiliations of the speakers. The principal witness was Professor Perry 
Dane, who at the time was an associate professor of law at Yale Law 
School.31 Michael Farris, whose affiliation was not identified in the 
transcript, also testified;32 he is the founding president of the Home School 
Legal Defense Association.33 The third witness was Stephen Mendleson,
who identified himself as speaking on behalf of the Legislative Coalition 
on Psychiatry and Human Rights, as well as two disability rights advocacy 
groups.34
Dane spoke in support of H.B. 6699 and offered a vigorous defense of 
why, in his view, a new statute was needed in response to the Smith
decision in order to fully protect the rights of religious believers whose 
“faith . . . directs them to obey the government of God as they understand 
it.”35 He asserted that when religious persons obey the commands of God it 
“is not just a matter of personal conscience . . . . [b]ut religious commands 
I think properly understood are themselves a form of law.”36 Consequently, 
                                                                                                                         
27 Jepsen Interview, supra note 8.
28 See text accompanying supra note 20.
29 Tulisano, of Rocky Hill, Connecticut, was a Democrat who represented the 29th District from 
1975 to 2001 and chaired the House Judiciary Committee from 1987 to 1993. Richard Don Tulisano,
LEGACY, www.legacy.com/obituaries/hartfordcourant/obituary.aspx?pid=103989235 [https://perma.cc/ 
YB9U-P8Y2] (last visited Feb. 19, 2018); see also Donna Tommelleo, Richard Tulisano; fought for 
liberties in Conn. House, BOSTON GLOBE (Feb. 22, 2008), http://archive.boston.com/
bostonglobe/obituaries/articles/2008/02/22/richard_tulisano_fought_for_liberties_in_conn_house/ 
[https://perma.cc/J7BA-DKFN] (describing Tulisano as “[a] mentor to many lawmakers . . . [who] 
championed constitutional issues and civil liberties”).
30 An Act Concerning the Restoration of Religious Freedom: Hearing on H.B. 6699 Before the J. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 1991 Conn. Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. 22 (Conn. 1991) [hereinafter 1991 
Public Hearing Transcript].
31 Id.
32 See id. at 28 (indicating that Farris’s identifying information was omitted due to a malfunction 
of the tape recording system used at the hearing). 
33 Attorneys, HOME SCH. LEGAL DEF. ASS’N, https://hslda.org/about/staff/attorneys/Farris.asp 
[https://perma.cc/F4FA-WVWV] (last visited Feb. 22, 2018). Michael Farris is a constitutional 
appellate lawyer who has been associated with the organization since 1983, and it appears like he 
testified at the hearing as a member of the organization. Id.; About HSLDA, HOME SCH. LEGAL DEF.
ASS’N, https://hslda.org/about/default.asp [https://perma.cc/9Y7C-KZ6L] (last visited Feb. 22, 2018).
34 1991 Public Hearing Transcript, supra note 30, at 123.
35 Id. at 22–23 (statement of Perry Dane, Prof., Yale Law School).
36 Id. at 22.
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religious believers are subject to two sets of commands and their need to 
obey God “is not just a matter of personal conscience.”37 He acknowledged 
that at times, religious commands will conflict with laws of the state and 
that a careful balance must be achieved, a goal, in his view, the bill 
achieved.38 In addition, he explained that the principle exempting religious 
believers is rooted in both the Bill of Rights of the U.S. Constitution as 
well as the Connecticut Declaration of Rights.39 He also noted that the 
Connecticut General Statutes already include specific exemptions for 
religious believers, and H.B. 6699 “is the natural extension of these 
existing statutes. It generalizes the principles that they embody and it 
extends it to all state laws and all religious beliefs. Subject of course to the 
state’s ability to show a compelling need.”40
Dane then explained why, even with those protections already in place, 
he believed the legislature should “enact this bill now.”41 Turning to the 
Supreme Court’s 1990 decision in Employment Division v. Smith,42 which 
weakened the compelling interest test, he pointed out that one basis for the 
Court’s holding was the idea that the religious-based exemptions should be 
determined by legislatures rather than courts.43 Therefore, he suggested 
“respectfully that now is the time to accept that invitation.”44 While Dane 
praised the bill as “wise and sound,” he also identified concerns about 
specific wording in the legislation that he recommended be changed.45 One 
concern involved redundant language in the bill, which he feared might 
lead to confusion.46 He also stated that he had a “second more general 
drafting concern . . . about the legislation . . . [because] it nowhere defines
what exactly what it means by burdening the person’s right to free exercise 
of religion.”47 As a result, Dane proposed that the legislature include 
additional language in the text of the bill to define a burden on religious 
belief.48 Alternatively, a second solution would be to write a preamble to 
make clear “the legislature’s intent to restore the state of the law as far as 
Connecticut is concerned . . . to where it was before Smith came down.”49
                                                                                                                         
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 Id. at 22–23.
40 Id. at 23.
41 Id.
42 See Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990) (holding that the state could deny 
unemployment benefits to a person fired for violating a state prohibition on drug use because of drug
use that was part of a religious ritual).
43 1991 Public Hearing Transcript, supra note 30, at 23 (statement of Perry Dane, Prof., Yale 
Law School).
44 Id. at 22. 
45 Id. at 23.
46 Id.
47 Id. at 24.
48 Id.
49 Id.
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Dane concluded his introductory remarks by reaffirming his support for 
H.B. 6699 and recommending that the committee do so as well.50
As legislators responded to Dane’s remarks, Representative Irving J.  
Stolberg51 sought clarification about the distinction between “matters of 
personal conscience and matters of religious organization” that the 
professor had made in his opening statement.52 Stolberg noted that as he 
understands relevant precedent and case law, “individual conscience that is 
equivalent to religious beliefs [is] afforded the same protections” as a 
religious conviction.53 In response, Dane explained that the courts have 
interpreted religion broadly and protection extends to nontraditional 
faiths.54 Nevertheless, he insisted that “distinguishing between religious 
belief and personal conscience really goes to the heart of the matter.”55
More specifically, he said that “the best way to understand religious 
conviction is that [it] itself is a form of law,” and as such it constitutes a 
unique legal system that must be recognized by the government.56
Continuing with his line of questioning, Stolberg pressed for 
elaboration about Dane’s distinction between matters of conscience and 
religious belief, which he did not accept, and asked for clarification.57 In 
other words, he wanted to know what differentiates “a small sect” from an 
individual who possesses deeply held beliefs that define his life and 
practice?58 Dane responded that the difference is not a matter of numbers, 
but rather is “a difference in the sort of motivations that lead people to 
come to certain conclusions,” highlighting the distinction between the 
individual who “felt commanded” to do something and the one who “had 
their own deeply felt convictions.”59 In the professor’s view, the individual 
who is not responding to a command but merely to deeply held convictions 
would be expected “to put them aside” and obey the law.60 When Stolberg 
asked if Dane’s approach would raise equal protection concerns for the 
many Americans who do not profess allegiance to a particular religion, the 
professor acknowledged that the Supreme Court has recognized the rights 
                                                                                                                         
50 Id.
51 Stolberg, a Democratic member of the Joint Committee on the Judiciary, served the 93rd 
District in New Haven from 1971 to 1993. Irving J. Stolberg, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA,
https://www.britannica.com/contributor/Irving-J-Stolberg/2864 [https://perma.cc/7DN4-8BKN] (last 
visited March 13, 2018).
52 1991 Public Hearing Transcript, supra note 30, at 24 (statement of Rep. Irving J. Stolberg, 
Member, J. Comm. on Judiciary).
53 Id.
54 Id. (statement of Perry Dane, Prof., Yale Law School).
55 Id. at 24–25.
56 Id. at 25.
57 Id. (statement of Rep. Irving J. Stolberg, Member, J. Comm. on Judiciary).
58 Id.
59 Id. at 26 (statement of Perry Dane, Prof., Yale Law School).
60 Id.
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of conscientious objectors.61 Even so, Dane remained committed to his 
original claim, contending that the actual text of the First Amendment 
affords special protections for religious believers.62
This thoughtful debate at the outset of the hearing focused on a very 
important question: To what extent would those who belong to minority 
religions, or, as Stolberg noted, were guided by deep moral convictions but 
belonged to no religious denomination, be protected after the Smith
decision? While Stolberg emphasized that in his view the First 
Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause fully protects both categories of 
believers fully, he and the professor agreed that the proposed law is 
necessary precisely because the Court’s decision altered decades of 
constitutional precedent by lowering the standard by which it would judge 
free exercise claims.63
Next, Representative Robert M. Ward,64 a Republican from the 86th
District, questioned Dane. He asked the professor to confirm first, that “it 
is both constitutional and appropriate for the General Assembly [to] 
consider adopting the compelling interest test,” and second, that the Smith
case would not prevent the state from applying state laws “when they 
conflict with religious freedoms” so long as the state has a compelling 
interest.65 Dane substantiated Ward’s understanding of Smith, stressing that 
in his view, an aspect of the Court’s rationale in the case was to say “that 
this sort of business of granting exemptions was essentially legislative 
rather than a judicial task.”66 He also noted that in a line of cases prior to 
Smith, the Court made clear that accommodating religious believers did not 
constitute an endorsement of religion.67 Concluding his questioning of the 
professor, Ward reiterated that the purpose of the legislation in Connecticut 
is to “restore . . . the kind of protection of religious freedom that existed 
prior to the Smith case[,] so roughly the last thirty years in this nation.”68
The exchange makes clear that members of the Joint Committee on the 
Judiciary clearly understood their task to be the restoration of a regime of 
religious freedom protections that were in place prior to the Smith decision
and that allowed for a workable balance between religious exemptions and 
                                                                                                                         
61 Id. at 26–27.
62 Id. at 26.
63 Id. at 22, 24.
64 Ward, a Republican, served the 86th District in the Connecticut General Assembly from 1985 
to 2006. Keith M. Phaneuf, Retiring Watchdog Robert Ward Lauded for 31 Years Serving CT, CT 
MIRROR (Oct. 3, 2016), http://ctmirror.org/2016/10/03/retiring-watchdog-robert-ward-lauded-for-31-
years-serving-ct/ [https://perma.cc/T6ZJ-YXDB].
65 1991 Public Hearing Transcript, supra note 30, at 27–28 (statement of Rep. Robert M. Ward, 
Member, J. Comm. on Judiciary).
66 Id. at 28 (statement of Perry Dane, Prof., Yale Law School).
67 Id.
68 Id. (statement of Rep. Robert M. Ward, Member, J. Comm. on Judiciary). Dane does not refer 
to specific cases in his testimony.
938 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:4
the state’s obligation to apply its laws in an evenhanded way. The 
discussion was well informed and indicated that these lawmakers had 
prepared themselves for the hearing.
The committee next turned to the testimony of Michael Farris, whose 
affiliation, as noted earlier, was omitted from the transcript due to a 
recording malfunction.69 He was also asked about the degree to which the 
Smith decision had diluted religious freedom protections by replacing the 
compelling state interest test with the rational basis test, a lower standard 
of review. Farris stated his disagreement with the Court’s lowering of the 
standard, which he colorfully described as a “rinky-dink reasonable 
relationship test that gives religious freedom no more right than the right to 
own a blue car.”70 Tulisano then followed up to inquire further about the 
consequences of applying a lower standard of review to evaluate religious 
freedom claims. He referenced particular religious practices that might 
potentially no longer be exempt from state law after Smith. Farris cited 
examples such as forcing the Catholic Church to ordain female priests, 
requiring Black Muslims to ordain whites, or insisting that Jews who have 
died undergo autopsies.71
The legislators and Farris went on to discuss a few specific cases 
involving the regulation of church interiors and related matters. Stolberg 
encouraged Farris to clarify some of his points on the issue of prisoner 
rights generally, and in particular, his stated assertion that Muslim 
prisoners would be “forced to eat pork,” when in fact what is at issue,
according to Stolberg, is the failure of the prison to offer an alternative 
choice.72 Some of Farris’ testimony is convoluted, but his main worry was 
that Smith had drastically diminished the rights of individuals to be exempt 
from state laws that conflict with their religious beliefs. In addition, he 
stated that he concurred with some of the changes in language 
recommended by Dane that would strengthen religious freedom protections 
in the proposed bill.73
One of the most interesting issues arose at the very end of Farris’s 
testimony during Representative Douglas C. Mintz’s  questioning.74 Mintz 
had just cosponsored Connecticut’s H.B. 7133, An Act Concerning 
Discrimination on the Basis of Sexual Orientation, which was passed by 
                                                                                                                         
69 Supra note 32.
70 1991 Public Hearing Transcript, supra note 30, at 28 (statement of Michael Farris).
71 Id.
72 Id. (statement of Rep. Irving J. Stolberg, Member, J. Comm. on Judiciary).
73 Id. (statement of Michael Farris).
74 Mintz was a Democratic representative from Norwalk who served in the House from 1986 to 
1992, and later as a Superior Court judge in Stamford and Norwalk. Francis X. Fay Jr., Student Went 
from Scoring Goals to Dispensing Justice, THE HOUR (Nov. 14, 2009 7:00 PM), 
https://www.thehour.com/norwalk/article/Student-went-from-scoring-goals-to-dispensing-8250245.php
[https://perma.cc/8XMN-XZCX].
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both houses of the legislature in April and signed into law on May 1,
1991.75 He specifically asked Farris to discuss the impact of the religious 
freedom bill on this other significant pending legislation.76 Interestingly, 
Farris did not answer the question directly, but pointed to two cases that 
had come to his attention, one of which concerned excluding homosexuals 
from a health club and the other requiring that a homosexual minister of 
music be hired by a church.77 Farris had a simple response that recognized 
a distinction borne out in future case law. He predicted that if the proposed 
Connecticut antidiscrimination law and the religious freedom laws were to 
be passed at the same time, “the health club would lose and the church 
would win.”78 According to Farris, while the health club would not be able 
to bar homosexuals from its facility, the church would retain its authority 
to choose its ministers in accordance with its religious principles. The 
questioning ended at this point, and there was no further discussion of the
potential conflict of rights. Garnering little attention at the time, this 
conflict has since become one of the major points of controversy in the 
current debate about religious freedom, as evidenced by several cases 
currently being litigated in the courts at both the state and federal levels.79
It is important to note that Farris is CEO of the Alliance Defending 
Freedom,80 an advocacy group representing Jack Phillips, the owner of the 
Masterpiece Cakeshop in a case decided by the Supreme Court on June 4, 
2018.81 The central question in the case, “[w]hether applying Colorado’s
public accommodations law to compel [the petitioner] to create expression 
that violates his sincerely held religious beliefs about marriage violates the 
Free Speech or Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment, was not 
decided by the Court.”82 Rather, in its narrow ruling, the justices 
determined that the state’s “treatment of Phillips’ case violated the State’s 
duty under the First Amendment not to base laws or regulations on 
hostility to a religion or religious viewpoint.”83 The Court concluded that 
members of the Colorado Civil Rights Commission had made denigrating 
remarks about Phillips’ religious beliefs during his hearing, thereby failing 
                                                                                                                         
75 CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 41a-81a et seq.
76 1991 Public Hearing Transcript, supra note 30, at 32 (statement of Rep. Douglas C. Mintz, 
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77 Id. (statement of Michael Farris).
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79 See Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 370 P.3d 272, 276 (explaining two dueling interests 
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80 Biography: Michael P. Farris, ALLIANCE DEFENDING FREEDOM,
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(last visited Apr. 21, 2018).
81 Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018).
82 Questions Presented, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, No. 16-111 
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83 Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1731.
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to treat him fairly.84 Moreover, Phillips returned to Colorado federal court 
again in August of 2018, alleging religious discrimination after refusing to 
bake a cake for a transgender woman.85
In addition, Farris’s organization also represented the National Institute 
of Family and Life Advocates in a case decided on June 26, 2018, in which 
it asked the Court to rule“[w]hether the disclosures required by the 
California Reproductive FACT Act violate the protections set forth in the 
Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment, applicable to the states 
through the Fourteenth Amendment.”86 In a 5-4 decision, the Court held 
that the disclosure requirements were likely to violate the First 
Amendment.87 While neither case addresses religious freedom directly, 
many of the amicus briefs in support argue that religious freedom is in fact 
at stake in both cases.88 We will return to these cases at a later point.
The final witness for H.B. 6699 was Stephen Mendleson who spoke on 
behalf the Legislative Coalition on Psychiatry and Human Rights. Dr. 
Mendleson also served on the Board of Directors of the Connecticut 
Citizens with Disabilities and the State Protection and Advocacy Office.89
He stated that he was appearing both to oppose another bill under 
consideration, An Act Concerning Cruelty to Persons, and to support the 
religious freedom bill.90 Appearing as a substitute for another member of 
the Legislative Coalition on Psychiatry and Human Rights, Dr. Mendleson
read from his colleague’s prepared testimony. He said that while the 
Coalition was pleased with the language of the bill, the organization 
believed that the bill might “be broadened to . . . ensure that no one would 
be forced to participate 
in . . . practices [that] violate[] his or her religious convictions.”91 He went 
on to explain that this matter is important because the tenets of psychiatry 
can come into conflict with doctrines of religious faith, as in the case of the 
use of electroshock therapy or prescription drugs, which are understood by 
some to be antithetical to religious teaching about medical treatment.92
                                                                                                                         
84 Id. at 1732.
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Given his position as a disability rights activist, his testimony was designed 
to represent the views of those who seek to carve out broad exemptions for 
religious believers who want to assert a right to refuse medical treatment. 
There was no further discussion of the matters he highlighted, and the 
hearing adjourned immediately following his testimony.93
Although the Catholic Church did not send a witness to testify at these 
hearings, the Connecticut Catholic Conference (CCC) submitted important 
written testimony in the form of a letter to the members of the Judiciary 
Committee on March 27, 1991. This letter provides a well-defined sense of 
the CCC’s position on the pending bill. William J. Wholean, author of the 
letter, stated that “the subject of the bill presents some very complicated 
problems requiring extensive study,” and the CCC is concerned that the 
bill “may do more harm than good.”94 Wholean also claimed that there is 
“no evidence that the Court will not engage in a process of self-correction” 
in the wake of the Smith decision.”95 Furthermore, the CCC emphasized 
that by providing “a statutory remedy to adjudicate free exercise claims . . . 
this bill, if enacted, could effectively freeze the Smith case as the last 
constitutional interpretation of the free exercise clause.”96 Finally, the CCC 
recommended that Connecticut should wait for Congress to act first before 
passing its own religious freedom law.97 In closing, Wholean said: “We 
respectfully suggest the Judiciary Committee wait and watch 
Congressional activity . . . and the next round of Supreme Court decisions 
to determine whether Smith will have a broad, invidious effect on religious 
freedom or will be subjected to self-correction by the Court.”98
As Wholean’s letter to the Judiciary Committee established, the CCC 
was particularly concerned about the unintended consequences of state 
laws creating statutory remedies to resolve religious freedom claims before 
both the Court and Congress were able to act at the national level. 
Preferring to proceed cautiously, the CCC did not offer support for a bill in 
1991 that its leadership feared might upset the delicate balance between 
free exercise and state authority that prevailed prior to the Smith decision.
Since H.B. 6699 did not reach the point of floor debate in 1991, the 
hearing provides the only public account of the issues that concerned 
Connecticut legislators at the time. It is evident from the March 22 hearing 
that legislators and witnesses alike testified that after the Smith decision a
new state law to protect religious freedom was needed and that there was 
                                                                                                                         
93 Id. at 125.
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broad consensus that the draft of the bill before them fulfilled their 
legislative objectives. As mentioned earlier, a similar bill was discussed in 
1992, but little progress was made.99 The legislation was taken up again in 
1993, which is the next chapter of the story.
II. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: H.B. 5645, AN ACT CONCERNING RELIGIOUS 
FREEDOM (1993)
The legislative history of H.B. 5645, the new religious freedom bill 
introduced in 1993, begins in January and culminates in the signing of the 
of the bill into law in late June.100 The bill proceeded normally in the 
General Assembly and public records are available for the following: the 
March 1 public hearing of the Joint Committee on the Judiciary, the May 
13 House debate, the Senate debate and amendment process, and the June 
1 discussion and passage of the bill as amended by the Senate.101 In 
addition, the Connecticut Office of Legislative Research provided analysis 
of both the original bill and the amended version. It should be noted that 
the title of the 1993 bill is An Act Concerning Religious Freedom, and the 
word “restoration” is no longer included.102 The Connecticut General 
Assembly website states that the purpose of the bill is: “To enhance the 
constitutional right of freedom of religion and reiterate the compelling 
interest test for free exercise of religion claims under the state 
constitution.”103 In the public records, there is no explanation of why the 
word “restoration” was dropped, but it is worth noting that the stated 
purpose of the 1991 bill had been: “To reinstate the compelling interest test 
for free exercise of religion claims which was eliminated in the United 
States Supreme Court decision of Employment Division v. Smith, 110 S. 
Ct. 1595 (1990).”104
Consequently, it appears that the purpose of the new legislation was
broadened to serve two distinct goals. The first was to “enhance the 
constitutional right of freedom of religion,”105 and the second was to 
reinforce the compelling interest test with respect to state-law-based free 
exercise claims.106 The analysis issued by the Office of Legislative 
Research explains that “the bill specifies the test that state courts must use 
in deciding cases in which individuals claim that the state has infringed on 
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their constitutional free-exercise-of-religion rights . . . [and] specifically 
authorizes people to go to court to enforce this right.”107 Thus, the 1993 bill
is more explicitly aimed at both guaranteeing the right of freedom of 
religion and restoring a rigorous test by which to judge individual claims. 
This Part will now examine the public hearing and legislative debates to 
identify and analyze issues that most concerned all participants in the 
process.
A. Joint Committee of the Judiciary, Public Hearing, March 1, 1993
The official speaker registration list for the March 1 public hearing 
includes only two witnesses for H.B. 5645. They are John King, then an 
attorney with the law firm of Updike, Kelly & Spellacy in Hartford, who 
spoke on behalf of the CCC in opposition to the bill, and Robert Leikind, 
who testified in his capacity as director of the Connecticut Anti-
Defamation League in support of the bill.108
1. Testimony of John King, for the Connecticut Catholic Conference
Senator George Jepsen, chair of the Joint Committee on the Judiciary, 
asked King to speak first. King began by saying that the CCC had not only 
been opposed to the two previous iterations of the bill currently before the 
committee (H.B. 6699, 1991 and H.B. 5019, 1992), but the organization 
remained opposed to the newest version of the bill.109 While today it may 
seem counterintuitive that the CCC would be opposed to a bill protecting 
religious freedom, the position articulated by King is consistent with the 
Catholic Church’s opposition to the bill at the federal level.110 Father 
Robert Drinan, a Democratic congressman from Massachusetts,111 and 
Jennifer I. Huttman authored a legislative history of the bill.112 In their 
article, they argue that the bill did not advance in 1991 (the 101st
Congress) or 1992 (the 102nd Congress) “primarily [due] to the opposition 
to the bill by the United States Catholic Conference [(USCC)], as well as 
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various pro-life groups—most especially the National Right to Life 
Committee”.113 The authors further contended that the “Catholic 
Conference feared the bill might be used to argue that legislation 
restricting abortions infringed on a woman’s religious beliefs.”114 In fact, 
the Catholic Church only lent its support to the federal bill on March 13, 
1993, nearly two weeks after King testified before the Joint Committee on 
the Judiciary.115 Given the evolving position of the USCC at the national 
level, King’s opposition to the bill in Connecticut is entirely consistent 
with Father Drinan’s account of Catholic opposition to the congressional 
bill in the early stages of the legislative process. It is noteworthy that King 
never mentions the issue of abortion in his testimony, especially since the 
matter later became a major obstacle to passing legislation at the national 
level.116
King identified several principal reasons for the CCC’s opposition to 
H.B. 5645. First, he stated that the CCC is not aware of any “instances of 
infringement of religious freedom in the State of Connecticut to justify 
what would in effect be overturning the recent decisions of the United 
States Supreme Court” in the area of First Amendment jurisprudence.117
This reasoning appears to conflict with the Catholic Church’s typical 
response to Supreme Court opinions with which it disagrees—most 
notably in this context, its response to the Roe v. Wade118 decision in 1973 
and subsequent cases dealing with abortion.119 King went on to provide a 
brief summary of the Smith case, noting that the application of the 
compelling interest test by the state courts in Oregon culminated in 
“bizarre results,” that could have allowed a person by virtue of his beliefs 
to become “a law unto himself.”120 This concern about protecting practices 
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that fell outside of traditional norms was raised again in the hearing, as 
well as in the legislative debate later in the process. 
Next, the CCC’s advocate expressed a worry that the Church’s 
tax-exempt status could be in jeopardy should Connecticut pass the 
religious freedom bill. He suggested that if the state adopted the 
compelling interest test, an individual might have been able to assert that 
“granting the tax-exempt status to a church violates one’s free exercise of 
religion,” thereby creating conflict and potential litigation over competing 
religious claims.121 He then reiterated his belief that Connecticut should 
follow the lead of the U.S. Supreme Court and adopt the same rational 
basis standard enunciated in Smith for reviewing an individual’s right to 
free exercise of religion.122
Senator Jepsen countered this argument by noting that it is a simple 
matter to guarantee free exercise in the easy cases and it is “only in the 
hard cases where you get down to doing something that’s unpopular or out 
of the mainstream that these amendments really count.”123 More 
specifically, the committee chair said, it is “only when you are willing to 
step out and protect the relatively non-conformist behavior [will] these 
constitutional rights really have teeth and really have meaning . . . .”124
Directly addressing the proper standard of review, the Senator asked King 
to explain how the nonconformist can be protected if the test does not 
require the state to demonstrate a compelling interest.125 King did not 
articulate a clear answer to the question but instead asserted that the 
rational basis standard is more appropriate.126 He provided the example of 
the need to enforce laws of general applicability, such as the payment of 
Social Security taxes, in order to avoid “truly bizarre results,” which in 
earlier Supreme Court cases “didn’t protect religious beliefs, but rather 
protected . . . bizarre conduct that was not essential to those religious 
beliefs.”127 In particular, King was concerned that the application of the 
compelling interest test by the Supreme Court has been subject to “swings 
on [the] bench” that make it “unworkable and unneeded.”128 In other 
words, he maintained that the adoption of the more stringent test would 
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likely weaken the state’s ability to police “bizarre conduct,” thereby 
creating problems for the courts.129
Continuing with his line of questioning, Senator Jepsen immediately 
pressed King on the matter of “bizarre conduct” while acknowledging that 
the shifting composition of the Supreme Court affects its free exercise 
jurisprudence. Responding directly to the witness, he said, “just accept and 
note that what you refer to as bizarre behavior is exactly the point I’m 
talking about. If it’s non-conformist, if it’s out of the ordinary . . . [and] out 
of the mainstream, we label it bizarre and then find a basis to disallow 
it.”130 In the Senator’s view, protection of religious freedom means that 
“sometimes you’ve got to let the bizarre exist.”131 In my interview with 
now-Attorney General Jepsen, he emphasized that what motivated him to 
propose the new religious freedom law in 1991 and pursue it to passage in 
1993 was his conviction that the Smith decision jeopardized rights of 
religious minorities, nonbelievers, and nonconformists, and the state 
needed to pass a law to protect them.132 The Senator’s exchange with King 
provides confirmation of the stated first objective of the legislation he 
ultimately helped craft, which embraces a broad guarantee of religious 
freedom that extends to religious worshipers and nonbelievers alike.133
Tulisano, the second co-chair of the Joint Judiciary Committee, joined 
Jepsen in questioning King about his defense of the rational basis test. 
They challenged the adequacy of the rational basis test by offering various 
examples of common religious practices, such as serving wine to minors in 
religious services, that would be imperiled under the less stringent test.134
King did not present a full counterargument and replied, “the Connecticut 
Catholic Conference, as a general proposition . . . is much more 
comfortable with the rational basis test than it is with the compelling 
interest [test].”135 Jepsen, on the other hand, concluded that unlike the 
weaker rational basis test, only a compelling interest test is adequate to 
protect the rights at stake because the more rigorous standard would 
require the state to “carve out a legislative exemption for this kind of event 
to meet that test.”136
What is particularly striking about this line of questioning is the fact 
that the legislators were persuasively advocating for a more vigorous 
                                                                                                                         
129 Id.
130 Id. at 79 (statement of Sen. George Jepsen, Co-Chairman, J. Comm. on Judiciary).
131 Id. 
132 Jepsen Interview, supra note 8.
133 1993 Public Hearing Transcript, supra note 108, at 75, 77–78 (statement of Sen. George 
Jepsen, Co-Chairman, J. Comm. on Judiciary).
134 Id. at 79–80 (statements of Sen. George Jepsen & Rep. Richard Tulisano, Co-Chairmen, J. 
Comm. on Judiciary).
135 Id. at 81 (statement of  John King, Att’y, Conn. Catholic Conf.).
136 Id. (statement of Sen. George Jepsen, Co-Chairman, J. Comm. on Judiciary).
2018] UNDER THE RADAR 947
protection of free exercise than the attorney for the Catholic Church. 
Senator Martin Looney137 raised the issue directly and said, “it just seems 
to me a little bit peculiar that the Catholic Conference would be supporting 
a position that would allow the state to intervene more readily in matters of 
religious expression.”138 Looney pursued the matter, probing to understand
why the Catholic Church was opposed to a standard that even its own 
attorney acknowledged affords a better guarantee of free exercise.139 In a 
lengthy and somewhat rambling reply, King again deferred to the judgment 
of the Supreme Court on the standard and reiterated his fear that raising the 
standard would spawn new litigation, drawing the courts into disputes he 
believes it should avoid.140 Despite the legislators’ efforts to evoke a clear 
response from the Church’s lawyer, his explanations for opposing the law 
tend to obfuscate rather than illuminate a coherent position or set of 
arguments. Compared with the first witness and the lawmakers, he seemed 
to be remarkably unwilling to engage the important issues.
When King was questioned by Representative Michael Jarjura,141 a
lawmaker less skeptical of the Church’s position, the contours of the 
underlying concerns about the bill became clearer. He began by revealing 
an essential theme of King’s testimony, namely that the bill would protect 
religious freedom too broadly.142 He stated, from “listening to the 
testimony today . . . from listening to you . . . this bill would basically 
legitimize fringe religions.”143 The Church’s attorney replied, “[w]ell, I 
think if you look at the payote [sic] instance, that . . . is correct.”144 Jarjura, 
a conservative Democrat, was concerned that religious practices like the 
use of peyote, at issue in the Smith case, would again be protected under 
                                                                                                                         
137 Looney, a Democrat from the 11th District, has been serving in the Senate since 1992. About 
Senator Looney, CONN. S. DEMOCRATS, http://www.senatedems.ct.gov/looney-about 
[https://perma.cc/HLR6-YEGF] (last visited Feb. 19, 2018). 
138 1993 Public Hearing Transcript, supra note 108, at 81 (statement of Sen. Martin Looney, 
Member, J. Comm. on Judiciary).
139 See id. (referring to Looney’s line of questioning regarding the Catholic Church’s position on 
free exercise protections). 
140 Id. at 81–82 (statement of John King, Att’y, Conn. Catholic Conf.). 
141 Jarjura, a Democrat at the time, served Waterbury’s 74th district from 1992 to 2002. Andrew 
Brophy, Flatto Faces Three in Bid for State Comptroller, FAIRFIELD PATCH (May 19, 2010), 
https://patch.com/connecticut/fairfield/flatto-faces-three-in-bid-for-state-comptroller
[https://perma.cc/2DHK-HGJF]. He became a Republican in 2011 in order to run for governor of the 
state. John Murray, Q&A with Waterbury’s Republican Party Mayoral Candidate, Incumbent Mike 
Jarjura, WATERBURY OBSERVER (Oct. 15, 2011), http://www.waterburyobserver.org/wod7/node/2699
[ https://perma.cc/AMG7-2WBR].
142 1993 Public Hearing Transcript, supra note 108, at 75 (statement of Rep. Michael Jarjura, 
Member, J. Comm. on Judiciary).
143 Id. at 82.
139 Id. (statement of John King, Att’y, Conn. Catholic Conf.).  
144 Id. (statement of John King, Att’y, Conn. Catholic Conf
948 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:4
the new law. He then asked King about whether marijuana use, bigamy, 
and polygamy would be protected under the higher standard of the 
compelling state interest. King responded in the affirmative, supporting 
Jarjura’s interpretation of the dangers the new law posed.145
Toward the end of King’s testimony, lawmakers raised specific 
examples of religious practices that had caused controversy, such as the 
use of candles in public ceremonies,146 and then turned back to the central 
question that seemed to confuse them about the position of the Church.147
Tulisano asked why the Church was now opposed to a bill that it had once 
hoped to pass at the national level.148 King’s response was vague and 
contradictory, since he maintained that the U.S. Catholic Conference was 
not in full agreement with the Smith decision, even while it opposed the 
approach taken by Connecticut lawmakers.149 Reacting with a degree of 
frustration, Tulisano then asked: “Well, what response are they in support 
of?”150 The Church’s attorney claimed that he did not have the answer to 
the question but that he would make an attempt to find out.151 This is an 
extraordinary admission on the part of the attorney speaking at a religious 
freedom hearing on behalf of the Catholic Church. While it is likely that 
there may have been little coordination between the CCC and the national
USCC on the matter, it is also possible that Connecticut’s first-in-the-
nation religious freedom restoration act was not on the national radar 
screen, especially since the entire legislative process took place outside of 
public view.
It is important to note that the CCC did not submit its own separate 
written testimony concerning the 1993 bill. Rather, Mark E. Chopko, 
general counsel for the USCC, forwarded materials to Father Thomas 
Barry of the CCC in response to a request. The forwarded documents
included a draft of the 1993 federal religious freedom bill before Congress 
at the time, as well as copies of the USCC’s federal Senate testimony and a
document outlining suggested legislative remedies. In his brief note, 
Chopko contended: “[T]he introduction of the federal legislation…argues 
against the need for a state legislative resolution.”152 It is particularly 
noteworthy that in the document analyzing legislative remedies in response 
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to the Smith decision, the USCC focuses on two matters: abortion and
third-party lawsuits.153 This document makes it apparent that the USCC 
was deeply troubled by its understanding of how a federal religious 
freedom law might provide women with a new free exercise claim against 
state laws that restrict their access to abortion.154 For example, authors of 
the document warn that a new federal law “would invite claimants to seek 
relief against any abortion statutes that are restrictive or regulate their 
access to abortion, and would allow litigation under an untested statute the 
requires the new statutory standard to be applied in every case.”155
While Attorney King did not mention the abortion issue in his 
testimony, he discussed third-party taxpayer lawsuits, as discussed 
above.156 The USCC presented its position on the matter in a direct way. 
The USCC was apprehensive that the proposed federal religious freedom 
law would potentially limit the ability of religious organizations to become 
involved in public programs or to receive tax exemptions.157 The authors of 
the document urged Congress to include language in the proposed law that 
would preserve the ability of religious organizations to participate in public 
programs.158
In conclusion, it is difficult to make a definitive determination about 
the lack of coordination between King and the CCC, based upon the 
records that are publicly available. Since Connecticut was the first state in 
the nation to propose and then pass a religious freedom bill, it is likely that 
the framers of Church strategy on the matter had not yet developed a 
position with respect to the states. In addition, the lack of news coverage 
meant that the debate in Connecticut took place below the radar.
2. Testimony of Robert Leikind, for the Connecticut Anti-Defamation 
League
The second and final witness to offer testimony at the hearing was 
Robert Leikind, Director of the Connecticut Office of the Anti-Defamation 
League,159 who, as mentioned above, spoke in support of the H.B. 5645. 
Leikind began by saying that “[t]he Anti-Defamation League believes this 
legislation is necessary in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in [Smith]
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and we urge its prompt adoption.”160 He then presented a clear, 
well-structured argument that recognized free exercise of religion as “a
core value of the nation,” and explained why he thought the bill under 
discussion must be passed in order to protect the citizens of Connecticut.161
Summarizing the negative consequences of the Smith decision that he 
believed diminished the guarantee of religious free exercise, Leikind 
expressed his principal concern that “[i]n the aftermath of Smith,
unfortunately, an individual can [no] longer rely on the free exercise clause 
to exempt a religious practice unless the law expressly targets [that] 
practice.”162 Moreover, the director of the Anti-Defamation League  
explained that each individual religious group might have to seek 
exemptions for its religious practices, and noted that “small and unpopular 
religious groups” may be unable to muster the necessary support from 
legislators.163
His unease seems to be at odds with the testimony of the first witness, 
who expressed the opposite concern, namely that “bizarre” practices might 
be protected under the language of the new bill.164 Stating unequivocally 
that there was “a need for corrective action to overcome the effect of 
Smith,” he then explained why the Anti-Defamation League joined other 
organizations, including the National Association of Evangelicals, the 
Christian Legal Society, and the ACLU, to support similar legislation at 
the national level.165
Leikind concluded his opening remarks by urging the legislature to 
pass H.B. 5645 to “ensure that we in Connecticut will not be entirely 
dependent upon the passage of the Federal Religious Freedom Restoration 
Act.”166 Legislators questioned him briefly, asking whether he knew of any 
actual examples of the Smith case having had a negative impact on 
religious free exercise, and he identified one case involving a Jewish
deceased man who was required to undergo an autopsy despite his family’s 
refusal on religious grounds.167 In fact, the case referred to by Leikind 
concerned a deceased Hmong man living in Rhode Island, whose family 
objected to an autopsy that the state nevertheless performed.168
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Jarjura reentered the discussion, returning to the problem of defining 
“legitimate religious conduct.”169 Leikind rejected the representative’s 
premise and said it was not appropriate to inquire about “what is legitimate 
religious conduct and what is not,” and that the focus instead must be on 
whether or not the state has a compelling interest in restricting a particular 
practice.170 In his view, the compelling interest test elegantly balanced the 
interest of the state in protecting health and welfare with the right of the 
individual to practice his or her religion.171 Jarjura then asked if Leikind
could point to results in Connecticut that have diminished religious free 
exercise in the wake of the decision, but Leikind asserted that his concerns 
about the impact of the Smith case went to a more fundamental problem:
the weakening of a “fundamental right that is a pillar of what society is 
built on.”172 He reminded the lawmakers of the large coalition of civil 
liberties and religious groups that supported his position on the bill.173
Astonishingly, at the end of his exchange with the witness, Jarjura 
admitted that he had not yet read the Smith decision but intended to do 
so.174 This is a conspicuous admission on the part of a legislator who took 
such an active role in the questioning of witnesses in the hearing. It must 
be noted that Jarjura was himself opposed to the legislation before the Joint 
Committee on the Judiciary, of which he was a member. The committee 
members discussed a few more technical questions, and then the hearing 
on H.B. 5645 concluded.
After reviewing these exchanges with witnesses, it is apparent that the 
members of the Judiciary Committee were, for the most part, 
knowledgeable about the complicated legal and policy issues and 
controversies surrounding the proposed religious freedom bill. They often 
asked penetrating questions of their witnesses in order to ensure that H.B.
5645 would accomplish the dual objectives they identified as the purpose 
of the law: (1) to robustly guarantee religious freedom, and (2) to mandate 
the use of the compelling interest test in adjudicating free exercise claims 
under the state constitution. The degree to which the supporters of the bill 
pressed King to explain the Catholic Church’s opposition to their genuine 
effort to enhance religious freedom is perhaps the most notable aspect of 
the hearing. While at the hearing there were few references to issues that 
now dominate the religious freedom debate, such as abortion, the 
testimony confirms that the focus of the bill’s supporters was to ensure that 
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religious believers, nonconformists, and nonbelievers would continue to 
receive strong state guarantees to act in accordance with their deeply held 
beliefs.
B. House Action on the Bill
On May 13, 1993, the Connecticut House passed H.B. 5645.175 The 
Honorable Chair of the Judiciary Committee, Tulisano, responded to 
Speaker John Ritter, who led the debate, by declaring at the outset that it is 
“one of the most important bills to come before the General Assembly” 
during the calendar year, making clear that “under the Connecticut 
Constitution, the State will be held to the highest degree possible, when it 
attempts to regulate the activity of any religion in our State under the 
Connecticut Constitution.”176 He mentioned that the 1991 version of the 
bill was not passed because at the time lawmakers were assured a similar 
bill would be passed at the national level.177 He reassured his colleagues 
that the current bill “enhances religious freedom and puts Connecticut once 
again in the forefront of supporting . . . free exercise.”178 Several members, 
including Ward, spoke to support the bill and to recognize that Connecticut 
would be “the first state in the nation” to reinstate the compelling interest 
test.179 Ward also clarified that the bill would have no impact on the tax 
exempt status of religious organizations and that it addresses only free 
exercise claims, a concern that had been raised during the March 1 
hearing.180 Representative Ellen Scalettar181 spoke in favor of the bill, 
presenting a list of all of the national organizations that supported the bill 
making its way through Congress at the national level, including the 
Presbyterian Church U.S.A., the Baptists Joint Committee on Public 
Affairs, the American Jewish Committee, the National Association of 
Evangelicals, and many others.182 Notably absent from the list is the U.S. 
Conference of Catholic Bishops.183
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Jarjura spoke next, admitting that he was the only member of the 
House who opposed the bill. He first reiterated the concerns he expressed 
at the March 1 hearing, focusing once again on “fringe religions” and 
“bizarre conduct.”184 The representative also argued that it would be better 
to wait for the federal government to take action because he believed the 
nation should speak with one voice on the matter.185
Other members raised concerns about the ability of the state to 
intervene on behalf of children whose parents may want to refuse medical 
treatment on religious grounds or to provide for the guardianship of 
children.186 Tulisano stated that the compelling interest standard protected 
children in the past and would continue to do so.187 Additional questions 
were posed regarding the impact of the new law on the use of wine in 
religious services,188 labor-employer negotiations,189 drug laws,190 parade 
restrictions and permits,191 time, place, and manner restrictions,192 and 
private-employer relations.193 In each instance, a supporter of the bill 
responded with reassurances and explained why the new bill does not 
present problems in each of the areas mentioned. As the debate moved 
toward its end, Representative Dale W. Radcliffe194 again expressed the 
fear, shared by Jarjura, that the new law would protect bizarre conduct.195
Tulisano responded by simply stating that it is hard to define “bizarre” 
conduct which is, in the final analysis, subjective.196 The debate concluded 
uneventfully, culminating in an overwhelming victory for supporters of the 
bill: 147 members voted in favor of the bill, 1 voted no, and 3 were absent 
or did not vote.197 Given the ardor of the supporters of the bill and their 
sense that Connecticut had taken a significant step by passing a law 
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broadly protecting religious freedom, it is remarkable that the public 
remained unaware of such an important piece of legislation.
C. Senate Action on the Bill
The Senate voted on the religious freedom bill on May 27, 1993.198 At 
the outset, Jepsen endorsed the bill, which had been amended to specify 
that the intention of the legislation “is limited to the issue of the free 
exercise of religion” and does not implicate the establishment clause.199 In 
other words, in response to questions raised in the public hearing and 
House debate, the bill had been amended to stipulate that the state would 
continue to provide subsidies to religious organizations or schools, such as 
bus services.200 One member sought confirmation that all relevant parties 
had been consulted in the writing of the amendment, and Jepsen responded 
affirmatively.201 Another member asked whether criminal actions would be 
protected under the new law, and Jepsen requested that discussion of the 
question be deferred until the amendment was adopted.202 The Senate then 
voted to adopt the amendment and began debate on the new version of the 
bill.203
Jepsen next led his colleagues through a brief history of the high 
standard of review that protected religious freedom until the Smith decision 
in 1989.204 He explained how the Court’s decision diminished religious 
free exercise protections, in effect making “the free exercise clause of our 
Constitution null and void.”205 Returning to the issue of criminal conduct,
the senator insisted “the compelling interest standard leaves plenty of room 
to rule invalid the more extreme forms of religious practice . . . while 
protecting the legitimate exercise of religion.”206 Although no senator 
asked a question on the topic, Jepsen also stipulated that the law is not 
meant to address the thorny matter of abortion rights.207 He made clear that 
“nothing in this law . . . is intended to expand or diminish or in any way 
affect abortion rights as they may exist in this state or any rights to choose 
or any issues affecting funding . . . .”208 Discovering a text he had intended 
to read into the record, Jepsen then continued his discussion of the abortion 
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issue.209 He noted that some have suggested that if Roe v. Wade210 were 
reversed, the new law could be used to overturn restrictions on abortion.211
Unpersuaded by this argument, the senator stated: “[T]his bill does not 
expand contract or alter the ability of a claimant to obtain relief in a 
manner consistent with the Supreme Court’s free exercise[] jurisprudence 
under the compelling interest prior to the Smith case.”212 No further 
questions were raised and the bill passed by a vote of thirty-six to zero.213
D. Final Action on the Bill
Two weeks after the Senate unanimously voted to pass the religious 
freedom bill, on June 1, 1993, the House also voted to approve H.B.
5645.214 Tulisano indicated that the amendment satisfied his wish to make 
crystal clear that nothing in the new legislation would affect “the 
establishment clause . . . and it would not in any way [a]ffect any funding 
or benefits given to religiously oriented groups.”215 Immediately following 
his statement, the House voted.216 The final tally was 141 in favor of the 
bill, 1 opposed, and 9 either absent or not voting.217 On June 29, 1993, 
Governor Lowell Weicker, Jr. signed the bill into law,218 an event that was 
not covered by the local press.
CONCLUSION
A review of the legislative history of Connecticut’s Religious Freedom 
Act of 1993 reveals that the decision to support the nation’s first state 
religious freedom law was relatively easy for most state legislators. 
Witness testimony and exchanges among the legislators in the Connecticut 
House and Senate supports then-Senator Jepsen’s sense that, for the most 
part, the new law was uncontroversial. While the legislative debate in both 
1991 and 1993 was robust, and there were important disagreements among 
the participants, the overwhelming majority of those who contributed to 
the discussions, fully and unequivocally, supported the bill and endorsed 
its passage. The only significant stakeholder to oppose the legislation in 
both 1991 and 1993 was the CCC, whose position in opposition seems 
surprising today. It is important to remember that, at the time, the Church 
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was preoccupied with the abortion issue, especially in the wake of the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s Planned Parenthood v. Casey219 decision in 1992. While 
some Court watchers had expected the Court to overturn Roe v. Wade, the 
5-4 plurality opinion explicitly affirmed a woman’s right to choose to 
terminate a pregnancy,220 while more-restrictive state practices aimed at 
creating obstacles for women to access abortion were approved. As the 
earlier analysis of the USCC’s written testimony at the time of the 1993 
legislative hearing indicates, the Church regarded proposed state religious 
freedom laws, at both the state and federal levels, as a genuine threat to its 
agenda to ban abortion in America.221
Another indicator of the lack of political controversy about the bill is 
the small number of potential stakeholders who contributed to the debate, 
either at the hearings or through written testimony submitted to the 
Judiciary Committee. Clearly, most religious organizations and other 
concerned groups did not expend time and resources to the passage of the 
bill. In 1991, in addition to the testimony of Perry Dunn, Michael Farris, 
and Stephen Mendleson at the March 18 hearing, the Judiciary Committee 
received only four submissions of written testimony. One was in 
opposition to the bill from the CCC and three were in support of the bill. 
Submissions were made by the Church of Psychiatry, the Christian Legal 
Society, and the American Coalition for Freedom of Connecticut.222
Likewise, in 1993, the CCC testified at the March 1 hearing and also 
submitted copious written testimony in opposition to the bill before the 
state legislature. Two individual letters were also submitted in favor of the 
bill by individuals affiliated with the Connecticut Anti-Defamation 
League.223 This written testimony supplemented the testimony of the two 
participants at the 1993 hearing, King, representing the CCC, and Leikind 
of the Anti-Defamation League. What accounts for the lack of participation 
among potential stakeholders? One can fairly conclude that the legislation, 
which garnered so little public attention and was aimed at restoring broad 
religious freedom protections to believers and nonbelievers alike, was 
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regarded as routine, necessary, and compatible with a normative set of 
deeply held values. 
Although the issues of abortion and gay rights did arise briefly in the 
legislative debates taking place in early 1990s, attitudes about those 
matters did not prevent legislators from developing and passing a strong 
state religious freedom law. Indeed, the CCC was an outlier with respect to 
its consistent opposition to the state religious freedom bill, even after the 
USCC offered its late support of the federal bill in March of 1993.224 In 
1993, Farris, who today leads his organization’s efforts to challenge state 
antidiscrimination laws on first amendment grounds at the state and federal 
level, testified in support of the Connecticut religious freedom law. Indeed, 
he was the only participant to articulate concerns about the potential 
conflict between the rights of religious believers and the claims of gays and 
lesbians seeking protection against discrimination in public 
accommodations. Recognizing the potential conflicts, especially since 
Connecticut had just passed its own sexual orientation antidiscrimination 
law,225 he nevertheless responded to questions about these matters in a 
matter-of-fact way and did not express alarm. The political landscape has 
radically changed in the two decades since Connecticut passed both of 
these laws. The legislative history of the state’s religious freedom bill 
provides an important context for understanding today’s political 
polarization that has resulted in the inability of elected officials and judges 
at all levels of government to resolve these competing claims.
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